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一　a　New　Moral　Thinking　Based　on　Japanese　Realities一
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Abstract：　The　aim　of　this　paper　is　to　examine　the　strong　tendency　to　regard　the　Western　values
of　human　fundamental　rights　as　universal　over　and　above　any　other　cultural　values．　This　ten－
dency　is　often　found　in　medical　ethics　education　as　well　as　in　philosophical　controversy　in
general．　ln　this　paper，　1　will　examine　this　issue　within　the　framework　of　my　own　theory　of
moral　thinking　based　on　evolving　Japanese　realities．
　　In　Japanese　society　today，　1　feel　the　need　to　recreate　a　certain　common　platform　for　discuss－
ing　the　moral　dilemma　concerning　issues　of　life　and　death．　ln　order　to　recreate　it，　there　must　be
a　certain　common　background　for　discussing　what　the　concept　of　the　good　life　can　be　defined
as，　and　further　what　the　greatest　common　ground　is　for　discussing　the　meaning　of　life　and　death．
1　believe　such　grounds　can　be　found　in　the　“domain　specific　value”　being　immanent　in　social
relationships，　and　the　“invisible　universal　value”　for　every　individual　being．　ln　conclusion，　I
believe　these　new　common　and　global　values　should　be　substituted　for　Western　values　advocat－
ing　universalism　and　antagonistic　tendencies．　A　deeper　understanding　ofWestern　values　c，an　be
achieved　though　thinking　this　way．
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1．　lntroduction
　　1　have　so　far　participated　several　times　in　international　conferences　concerning　bioethics，　medical　ethics
or　the　philosophy　of　medicine　in　various　foreign，　mainly　Western，　countries．　At　such　conferences　where
certain　Western　values　based　on　fundamental　human　rights　always　were　dominant，　1　observed　members
from　non－Westem　countries　displaying　various　emotions，　both　overtly　and　covertly　as　well　as　officially　or
privately．　Some　appreciated　those　Western　values　and　criticized　their　own　culturally　“backward”　values．
Accepting　Western　values　as　reasonable，　some　claimed　it　was　too　difficult　to　apply　them　directly　to　their
own　societies．　Some　supposed　Western　values　were　strategically　useful　in　the　present　time　but　would　be
overcome　in　the　future．　There　might　have　even　been　some　outright　rejection　of　these　Western　values，
although　such　a　stand　was　not　outspoken　of　directly．　At　any　rate，　it　seemed　to　me　that　those　non－Westem
participants　could　not　adequately　bridge　the　gap　that　exists　between　Western　and　their　own　cultural　val－
ues（i）．　That　is　still　the　case　that　exists　today．　Generally　speaking，　such　bridging　of　gaps　involves　various
controversies　between　uniりersatis〃i　and　multi－cuttura”伽，　which　is　now　under　discussion　in　contempo－
rary　political　philosophy　in　particulaif2）．　ln　this　paper，　1　propose　an　alternate　framework　that　may　be　useful
in　bridging　the　cultural　value　gap．
2．　Double　tasks
　　Since　around　the　end　of　the　1970s，　moral　realities　in　Japanese　society　has　gradually　changed　through
commercialization，　technologica｝　developments　and　social　transformations，　as　will　be　discussed　in　more
detailed　further　on　in　this　paper．　Accompanied　by　changing　realities，　various　questions　conceming　the
issues　of　life　and　death　have　been　raised．　Ordinary　people，　professionals，　experts　on　policy　making　and
students　are　all　at　a　loss　on　how　to　decide　in　what　terms　the　issues　of　brain　death　transplantation，　reproduc－
tive　therapy，　gene　manipulation，　euthanasia，　artificial　abortion，　suicide，　etc．，　are　to　be　discussed　．
　　In　such　circumstances，　“bioethics”　in　a　narrow　sense，　namely　in　terms　of　the　North　American　version，
was　introduced　about　the　end　of　the　1980s，　and　then　filtered　rapidly　into　our　society　during　the　1990s．　lt
now　seems　to　have　filtered　throughout　Japanese　society　and　even，　to　some　extent，　penetrated　the　thinking
of　the　younger　generation．　Such　a　penetration　of　bioethics　into　the　social　vernacular　is，　1　suppose，　signifi－
cant　in　three　ways：
　　1）　Greatly　stimulated　by　the　words　or　ideas　of　bioethics，　many　ethicists　were　activated　and　began　to
positively　discuss　those　particular　questions　for　the　first　time．　As　far　as　the　quality　of　their　moral　thinking
and　discussions　are　concerned，　however，　they　often　remain　too　theoretical　and　ideological　to　respond
adequately　to　ordinary　people’s　needs　and　professionals’　requests．
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　　2）　On　one　hand，　in　medical　practice　and　education，　directly　challenging　the　claims　of　bioethics　is　to　a
certain　extent　accepted　as　reasonable．　On　the　other　hand，　a　certain　quasi－paternalistic　custom　among
professionals，　families　and　communities　still　retains　its　power，　even　though　it　is　surely　weaker　than　before．
As　a　result，　the　term　“informed　consent”　has　become　common　only　in　a　superficial　way　and　in　the　weak－
ened　acceptance　of　the　concept　of　“self－determination”．
　　3）　The　third　point　is　partly　based　on　the　fact　that　the　modern　Western　idea　of　“accountability”　is　lacking
in　Japanese　culture．　Discussion　of　bioethics　has　further　accelerated　tendencies　towards　pluralization　and
an　incommensurability　among　opinions　on　the　cause　of　social　confiicts　concerning　values．　Typical　cases
include　the　discussion　over　brain　death　that　has　continued　over　a　decade．　1　think　the　focus　of　such　confiicts
is　on　how　to　evaluate　the　value－premises　of　bioethics，　that　is，　its　so－called　universatism．
　　Against　such　a　background　Japanese　medical　ethics　education　takes　place．　Therefore，　it　inevitably
involves　a　double　task．　One　is　how　to　foster　excellent　（and　virtuous）　professionals　fitted　to　such　evolving
settings．　For　that　purpose，　education　staff　need　to　develop　various　efficient　techniques　or　methods　to
prepare　their　students　for　the　difficult　challenges　and　decisions　that　lie　ahead．　Leaning　from　precedents　in
North　America　and　other　countries，　Japanese　educators　have　been　developing　some　methodologies　as
well．　A　standard　casebook　based　on　Japanese　realities　has　also　finally　been　prepared　quite　recently．
　　However，　1　feel　there　is　still　an　atmosphere　of　hesitation　or　embarrassment　as　a　whole．　ln　my　opinion，
it　is　because　other　value－problem　exists　and　these　have　not　yet　been　resolved　among　people　in　society．　The
first　task　depends　on　the　second　task　of　how　to　resolve　this　problem．　lt　is　this　second　task　that　I　want　to
examine　below　from　my　own　approach　to　moral　thinking（3＞．
3．　Two　problems
　　Let　us　start　by　considering　the　following　two　problems．　They　are　central　of　our　discussions　about
cultural　values，　and　cause　incommensurable　opposition　among　various　groups　of　society．
　　The　first　problem　is　how　the　issue　of　individual　freedom　or　privacy　is　dealt　with　in　particular　societies，
communities　or　60untries．　As　far　as　medical　relationships　are　concemed，　patient’s　preferences　are　the　case
in　point．　ln　this　panicular　case，　the　question　means，　for　example，　whether　the　idea　of　self－determination　is
paramount　or　not，　even　if　patients’　desires　seem　to　be　very　foolish　from　the　professional’s　viewpoint．
　　During．　the　1980s　and　1990s，　Japanese　society　became　extremely　rich　in　a　material　and　macroeconomic
sense，　compared　with　other　countries．　ln　this　circumstance，　individuals’　desires　were　set　free　and　have
been　more　and　more　stimulated　as　time　passed．　Previously，　most　Japanese　people　had　controlled　their　own
desires　and　behavjors・　through　internalizing　authority－community　oriented　ethics　（Seken　in　Japanese）．　The
weaker　and　more　limited　the　authority　of　traditional’ethics　has　become，　the　stronger　and　broader　individu一
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als’　consumptive　desires　have　grown．　Nevertheless，　Seken　as　a　custom　is　not　completely　dead　and　still
controls　part　of　each　individual’s　heart　to　some　extent．　ln　short，　individual　freedom　remains　dangling　in
midair　without　being　given　its　appropriate　position　within　modern　Japanese　society．
　　The　second　problem　is　whether　and　how　we　should　publicly　discuss　the　idea　of　the　good　life　or　not．　lt
is　most　likely　that　when　the　majority　of　people　are　confronted　with　various　moral　dilemmas，　it　is　their
emotions　rather　than　their　reasoning　that　deterrnines　the　ultimate　decision　made．　For　example，　even　though
the　ri’№?煤@to　an　abortion　is　legitimately　approved，　the　actual　deeision　to　exercise　that　right　often　depends　on
one’s　emotions　or　emotional　state．　Although　infiuenced　by　the　emotions　within　one’s　heart，　individual
morality　generally　functions　and　still　to　some　extent　directs　the　decisions　one　makes．　The　basis　of　one’s
morality　is　nothing　more　than　one’s　idea　of　what　constitutes　the．　good　life．　Certainly，　both　morality　and　the
concept　of　the　good　life　are　the　most　private　and　intimate　of　things．　Can　it　really　be　discussed　openly？
　　In　circumstances　where　overwhelmingly　consumptive　cultures　hold　reign，　most　people　generally　seem
to　become　pleasure　seeking　and　lose　a　sense　of　the　limits　to　thei’r　pleasure．　As　a　result，　any　limits　or
prohibitions　fade　gradually　away　from　one’s　life　as　they　progress　from　birth　to　death．　Consequently，　the
vivid　feeling　of　living　fades　away　and　an　image　of　death　or　finality　become　vague．　That　is　the　reason　why
there　are　various　trials　or　desires　to　seek　in　so－called　spiritual　supports　or　in　such　kinds　of　gratification．
Such　gratification　seeking　partly　explains　the　environment　in　which　many　cult　groups　like　Ohmu　Shinri
Kyoh　have　sprung　up　and　thrived．　Traditional　spiritualism　firmly　existed　before　in　society　but　it　is　disap－
pearing．　Although　thoughts　of　human　rights　are　not　yet　deep－routed　in　the　social　and　pubiic　lifg　of　Japan，
some　types　of　skepticism，　isolationism　or　dogmatism　have　appeared　and　spread．　ln　．short，　no　common
spiritual　background　seems　to　exist　in　modern　Japanese　society．
4．　Domain　specific　values
　　As　mentioned　earlier，　in　the　case　of　ethical　dilemmas　concerning　individualfreedom，　discussions　need
to　take　place　in　moral　rather　than　legal　rights　terms　in　educational　environments．　However，　once　we　begin
to　discuss　this　issue　based　on　morality，　we　immediately　realize　that　no　common　platform　for　moral　discus－
sion　exists　in　Japanese　society．　Therefore，　the　first　consideration　needs　to　be　the　establishment　of　such　a
common　moral　platform．　lf　the　development　of　such　a　platform　is　to　be　possible，　then　the　following　two
conditions　are　necessary．　They　are　the　“specific　domain　value”　and　the　“universal　invisible　value”．　First，
let　us　examine　the　former（4）．
　　Nowadays　in　Japanese　society，　individual　freedom　is　not　given　appropriate　regard．　lt　is　due　to　the　fact，
in　my　opinion，　that　its　definition　and　applicability　remain　ambiguous．　To　remedy　this　situation，　specific
limits　need　to　be　set　on　the　freedoms　available　to　the　individual　and　find　appropriate　approve　on　the
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condition　that　it　confines　itself　within　these　set　limits．　1　suppose　that　each　social　relationship　basically　has
its　own　intrinsic　value．　These　different　values　provide　panicular　limits　to　each　individuals’　behaviors　in
panicular　relationships．
　　1　think　the　following　points　provide　a　workable　framework：
　　1）　lt　is　recognized　that　individuals　act　both　overtly　and　covertly　in　all　their　social　relationships．　Gener－
ally　speaking，　one’s　freedom　exists　only　within　panicular　boundaries，　for　example，　parents’　freedom　and
children’s　freedom　within　the　family　unit，　teacher’s　・freedom　and　pupil’s　freedom　within　the　school　envi－
ronment，　etc．．　However，　although　freedom　may　sometimes　be　regarded　as　something　abstract，　it　in　fact
exists　even　in　the　civil　relationships　among　strangers．
　　2）Each　particular　social　relationsh量p　has，　in　my　opinion，　its　own　int血sic　goals　as　well　as　norms　derived
from　these　goals．　These　oblige　people　involved　in　a　particular　relationships　to　act　appropriately　in　their
roles　according　to　their　positions．　There　is　a　set　of　particu｝ar　goals，　norms　apd　obligations　derived　from
these　parameters　that　are　supposed　to　be　essential　in　any　social　relationship．　1　call　this　set　the　“domain　（or
sphere）　values”．　Each　domain　value　is　linked　to　others，　organized　into　a　specific　network　and　mutually
restricted，　due　to　the　complicated　network　of　social　relationships　each　individual　is　involved　in．
　　3）　What　should　be　sought，　discussed　and　interpreted　in　medical　ethics　education　is　surely　the　“medical
domain　values”．　These　deals　with　such　questions　as　the　following：　What　should　be　the　goals　of　medicine？
What　should　be　the　norms　of　medicine？　What　constitutes　health　or　illness？　lf　those　participating　in
medical　education　do　not　raise，　debate　and　try　to　answer　these　questions，　then　appropriate　behaviors　for
professionals，　patients，　families，　communities　and　even　nations　will　rerr｝ain　unclear．　Nor　will　the　ideal　of
what　constitutes　“good　medicine”　become　any　clearer．
5．　lnvisible　universal　values
　　Let　us　turn　to　the　second　condition．　Moral　discussions　inevitably　include　ideas　of　what　constitutes　the
good　ltfe．　Therefore，　if　no　common　ground　can　be　found　for　discussing　what　is　the　good　life，　a　common
moral　platform　may　not　be　possible　to　set．　How　can　we　find　a　common　ground　for　values？　ls　it　at　all
possible，　even　if　it　is　so　necessary？
　　Certainly，　skeptical　or　critical　thinking　is　always　necessqry　for　us．　But，　1　cannot　agree　with　all　types　of
skepticism　or　neutralism．　Such　obstructive　stands　will　only　further　strengthen　the　current　tendencies　to
accept　desires　without　any　limits　to　seductive　consumerism．　1　also　cannot　agree　with　any　stands　on　dog－
matism，　because　plurality　is　one　of　the　most　valuable　assets　wherever　people　live　together．
　　The　ideal　way　forward　is　to　recreate　a　common　ground　where　diverse　ideas　of　the　good　life　can　be
discussod　among　people．　First，　it　would　be　necessary　to　go　back　to　the　meanings　of　life　and　death，　because
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these　meanings　are　the　foundation　and　framework　of　the　ideas　concerning　the　good　life．　Then，　through
dialogue　with　a　wide　variety　of　experts　on　metaphysics　and　religions，　the　widest　common　ground　for
meanings　that　are　potentially　shared　amongst　them　could　be　found．　What　could　be　the　greatest　common
ground　for　discussing　the　meanings　in　this　question？　My　tentative　ideas　are　essentially　as　follows：
　　1）　Every　being　is　mutually　supported　through　various　functionings　of　all　things　in　existence　（causal，
intentional，　symbolic　etc．）．　1　think　such　an　idea　is　positive　in　the　ontological　sense　of　Nothing．　ln　this
sense，　each　individual　being　is　fundamentally　egually　accidental　and　rare，　and　therefore　equally　precious
and　irreplaceable．　Such　characterization　applies　to　every　being　in　all　time　and　space，　dead　or　alive，　regard－
less　of　ability　to　narrate　or　not（5）．
　　2）　The　“lnvisible　universe”　consists　of　each　equal　individual　being．　This　imaginary　uniVerse　or　public
is　beyond　every　visible　present　state，　community　or　civil　society．　1　can　well　imagine，　within　this　domain，
certain　sets　of　appropriate　behaviors，　perspectives　on　the　world　and　meanings　of　life　and　death．　These　sets
would　have　been　constructed　by　from　past　beings，　and　passed　on　to血ture　beings．　I　call　these　the‘‘univer－
sal　invisible　values”．
　　3）　ln　terms　of　the　criterion　of　these　values　and　consequent　ethics　’derived　from　them，　1　believe　it　to　be
received　by　each　individual　being　as　a　whole，　which　can　not　be　reduced　from　any　specific　and　fixed
viewpoints　like　national　identity，　sexual　identity，　ability，　genes，　etc．．
6．　A　new　common　value　framework
　　1　have　so　far　clairned　that　it　is　necessary　for　Japanese　society　to　recreate　a　certain　moral　common　plat－
form　for　discussing　various　ethical　dilemmas，　and　furthermore，　pointed　out　its　two　requisites，　namely，
“domain　specific　values”　and　“invisible　universal　values”．　ln　my　opinion，　these　two　conditions　set　a　new
perspective　from　which　we　can　critically　consider　and　revise　universalism　and　its　antagonism　to　multi－
culturalism．
　　In　general，　universalism　insists　Western　yalues　are　universal　above　and　over　any　other　cultural　values．
As　mentioned　previously，　universal　values　are　expressed　in　the　form　of　human　rights，　the　main　pillars　of
which　are　respect　for　the　individual，　freedom　and　equality（6｝．　ln　particular，　1　think　respect　for　the　individual
is　at　the　center　of　Western　values．　Certainly，　1　also　believe　the　idea　of　respect　for　the　individual　is　the　most
important　value　that　human　beings　have　ever　conceived　in　the　past．　But，　if　we　do　not　continue　to　always
question　why　respect　for　the　individual　is　so　important，　then　we　would　lose　its　significance．　And　it　would
become　too　formulized　or　legalistic，　as　can　be　seen　everywhere　nowadays．
　　It　seems　to　me　that　the　reasons　for　the　current　situation　are　not　necessarily　clear．　This　is　because　mutli－
culturalism，　which　demands’　freedom　as　well　as　respect　for　each　individual　special　cultural　as　well　as
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political　values，　prevails．　1　believe　the　reason　lies　in　“invisible　universal　values”．　On　the　other　hand，
invisible　universal　values　are　a　kind　of　the　great　common　ground　extracted　from　various　cultural　customs
or　traditions　such　as　religion　or　metaphysics．　Therefore，　it　offers　a　certain　critical　viewpoint　to　some　too
arbitrary，　with　strange　rules　or　realities　within　them，　for　example，　the　refusal　to　accept　blood　transfusions
based　on　obscure　religious　reasons　or　women’s　disadvantageous　social　pdsition．
　　In　terms　of　“domain　specific　values”，　it　respects　multi－dimensional　social　relationships　and　offers　a
viewpoint　with　a　difference．　Such　a　perspective　is　needed　and　becomes　more　indispensable　in　an　increas－
ingly　monistic　world．　lt　is　partly　because　universalism　is　historically　based　on　civil　relationships　among
strangers，　which　is　merely　one　type　of　social　relationship，　even　as　civil　society　is　very　important　in　an
increasingly　interconBected　world．　Another　partly　stems　from　commercial　relationships．　．that　are　almost
the　as　same　as　in　civil　society　in　contemporary　Japan　which　now　are　remarkably　prevalent．　On　the　other
hand，　similar　monistic　and　holistic　tendencies　seem　to　be　strongly　rooted　within　multi－culturalism．　Some
say　that　its　tendencies　in　non－Western　countries，　as　well　as　in　some　religious　and　quasi－communitarian
movements，　are　rather　stronger　than　in　Western　societies．
　　In　conclusion（7），　another　perspective　or　way　of　morai　thinking　regarding　Western　cultural　values　as
universal　is　needed．　ln　other　word，　we　need　a　kind　of　global　common　ground　for　discussing　diverse　ideas
of　the　good　life．　My　new　perspective，　given　in　this　paper，　is　merely　an　alternate　way　of　how　a　common
global　framework　could　be　found．　Such　a　global　common　ground　is　important　for　each　specific　domain
and　all　beings’　in　the　universal　public．　lt　also　provides　an　ideal　platform　for　diverse，　original　and　conse－
quent　interpretations．　Therefore，　all　possible　approaches　must　be　diverse　enough　for　individuals　and　groups
from　various　backgrounds．
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Footnotes
（1）　1　felt　the　same　was　the　case　at　the　latest　international　conference：　Ethics　Education　in　Medical　Schools　（February
　　　13－16，　2000，　Eilat，　lsrael，　under　the　auspices　ofthe　Secretary　of　the　Council　ofEurope　and　UNESCO　etc．，　organized
　　　by　The　lnternational　Center　for　Health，　Law　and　Ethics　University　of　Haifa，　School　of　Law）．　lt　is　because　of　this　I
　　　changed　here　the　theme　of　the　paper　submitted　from　method／virtue　problems　to　cultural　va且ue　problems．　By　this
　　　way，　my　original　paper　read　there　was　titled　“What　to　be　asked　beforelin　Ethical　Education－Virtues　based　on　the
　　concrete　method　of　moral　thinking”．
（2）　For　example，　Rawls，　J．，　A　Theory　of　Justice，　Cambridge，　Mass．，　Harvard　Univerg．　ity　presg．　，　1971；　Sandel，　M．　J．，
　　Liberalism　and　the　Limits　of　Justice，　Cambridge，　Cambridge　University　Presg．　，　1982；　Taylor，　Ch．，　Philosophy　and
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　　　Human　Sciences：　Philosophical　Papers　2，　Cambridge，　Cambridge　University　Press，　1985；　Maclntyre，　A．，　After
　　　Virtue，　Notre　Dame，　University　of　Notre　Dame，　1984；　Rawls，　J．，　Political　Liberalism，　New　York，　Columbia　Univer－
　　　sity　Press，　1993一　etc．
（3）　1　presented　my　thoughts　on　moral　thinking　in　my　book　entitled　Shi　no　Sentaku　（263p．，　Tokyo，　Mado－sha，　1999），
　　　The　title　in　English　means　“Choices　on　death”．
（4）　Certainly　there　is　also　another　more　previous　condition，　that　is，　the　“precondition　of　free　will”．　What　used　to　be
　　　pointed　out　in　terms　of　free　will’s　element　is　competence　ofjudgment，　understandings　of　information　and　spontane－
　　　ity．　And　a11　these　or　any　other　elements，　if　necessary，　together　organize　agent’s　responsibility．　Of　course，　in　contem－
　　　porary　advanced　societies　in　genera1，　results　of　individual　action　are　more　and　more　so　probable　or　collective　that
　　　sociologists　who　point　out　the　following　fact　are　increasing．　That　is，　the　concept　of　responsibility　is　less　valid　and
　　　the　idea　of　individual　and　morality　turn　out　nonsense．　Surely，　how　to　reconstruct　these　concepts　is　an　important
　　　philosophical　task．
（5）　1　suppose　that　if　we　can　imagine　the　largest　group　of　persons，　it　would　consist　of　such　every　being　expressed　this
　　　way．　We　need　to　change　the　concept　of　“person”．
（6）　For　example，　Lucus，　S．　M．，　lndividualism，　Oxford，　1973；　Hayek，　F．　A．，　lndividualism：　True　and　False，　in　lndividu－
　　　alism　and　Economic　Order，　London，　Routlege　＆　Kegan　Paul　Ltd，　1949，　Chap．　1，　pp．　1－32；　Bellah，　R．　N．　et　al．，
　　　Habits　of　the　Heart：　lndividualism　and　Commitment　in　American　Life，　Berkeley，　University　of　California　Preg．　s，
　　　1985；　Freeden，　M．，　Rights，　Open　University　Press，　1991　etc，
（7）　1　shall　further　present　my　thoughts．concerning　methodlvirtue　problems．　lt　is　certain　that　method　is　important．
　　　However，　when　it　does　not　function　as　one’s　morality　or，　in　other　word，　it　become　one’s　virtue，　then　method　is
　　　nothing　but　a　mere　reasoning　frame．　Within　normative　theories　and　bioethics　in　the　narrow　sense，　only　the　second－
　　　ary　p6sition　has　usually　been　placed　on　virtues．　lt　is，　1　believe，　because　most　proponents　of　virtue　ethics　used　not　to
　　　make　a　certain　criterion　of　appropriateness　clear，　but　then　only　to　attribute　it　to　vi血ous　persons（ecce　homo）．　In　my
　　　opinion，　a　certain　criterion　of　appropriateness　fundamentally　belongs　to　or　is　intrinsic　in　each　practical　relationship，
　　　namely，　specific　domain．　By　thinking　this　way，　the　weakness　of　virtue　ethics　is　for　the　frrst　time　overcome．　As　far
　　as　medical　settings　are　concerned，　the　criterion　is　attributed　to　the　medica且domain　valuelethics，　and　f瞭her　to　the
　　invisible　universal　value／ethics　in　the　inv韮sible　public，　Theref（）re，　two　kinds　of　cardina匪virtues　can　be　supposed，
　　that　is，　medical　specific　vir伽e　for　all　members　involved　with　medical　relationships　on　one　hand，　and　universal　and
　　invisible　virtue　for　all　members　in　the　invisible　public　on　the　other　hand．
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